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MUST GOD CREATE? 
Sandra L. Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan 
In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the tradi-
tional position that Cod created with absolute freedom. The first set fea-
tures several variations of Leibniz's basic proof that Cod must create the 
best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the claim that 
Cod must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is 
essentially self-diffusive. We argue that neither the Leibnizian nor the 
Dionysian arguments are successful. 
God "does whatever he pleases in heaven, on earth, in the waters and all 
the depths," the Psalter proclaims.] God is "the One who guides all 
things as he decides by his own will," and "by his own choice he gave 
birth to us," Ephesians tells us. 2 Scriptural teaching concerning God's 
absolute freedom in creation was upheld by Augustine and many of the 
Church Fathers, and elaborated by Aquinas and other Doctors of the 
Church, who argued that not only revelation but reason as well displays 
the truth concerning God's freedom: the infinite and self-sufficient 
divine nature entails absolute divine freedom. In the nineteenth century 
Vatican I recognized the Church's constant teaching concerning God's 
free creation as defined dogma: it is an article of faith for Catholics that 
God created "by a volition free of all necessity."3 
In this paper we evaluate two sets of theistic arguments against the 
traditional position that God created with absolute freedom. The first 
set features several variations of Leibniz's basic proof that God must cre-
ate the best possible world. The arguments in the second set base the 
claim that God must create on the Platonic or Dionysian principle that 
goodness is essentially self-diffusive. In the course of our discussion of 
these two sets of arguments we will comment on recent work by Philip 
Quinn, Robert Adams, and Norman Kretzmann. 
(I) 
We begin with a simple Leibnizian line of reasoning that gives us a theis-
tic objection to the position that God created with absolute freedom. Our 
aim in discussing the line of reasoning is not to overview or engage the vast 
secondary literature it has spawned, but rather to set up what we think is a 
new criticism, which will emerge as we discuss variations of the argument. 
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(L) 1. 
2. 
So, 3. 
Faith and Philosophy 
If there is a best possible world, then God must actual-
ize" or create it. 
There is a best possible world. 
God must create the best possible world. 
We call this a "theistic" objection to the position that God created with 
absolute freedom since Leibniz was a theist, a compatibilist who held 
that God's creation was both free and necessitated, though not absolute-
ly free, not free from every necessity. More often than not, however, 
those who approve Leibniz's claim that God must create the best scorn 
his rosy view of our own world, and use his "optimistic" arguments5 to 
help build a case for atheism. 
Recent literature on whether God must create the best has been criti-
cal of the second premise in argument (L).6 Why even think that the 
concept "best possible world" is coherent? Why not suppose that there 
must be an infinite series of better and better worlds, or infinitely many 
worlds in the set of best possible worlds? Leibniz did have arguments 
in support of the second premise of (L), arguments which brings us face 
to face with his view of our own world. Leibniz held it is possible there is 
a best world because the actual world is in fact the best world. It was not 
close inspection of our world that led him to his assessment, but rather 
reasoning such as this:7 
(L *) 1. God chose to create this world over all other possible worlds. 
2. It is irrational to choose x over y unless one judges x to be 
better than y. 
3. God cannot act irrationally (either because no one can act 
irrationally, or because a perfectly good agent cannot act 
irrationally). 
So, 4. This world is better than all other possible worlds. 
Another, similar argument' 
(L**) 1. 
2. 
So, 3. 
God chose to create this world over all other possible worlds. 
Choice implies moral preference: no one can choose x over 
y without judging x to be better than y. 
This world is better than all other possible worlds. 
Each of these arguments has serious difficulties. To begin with, of 
course, the contradictory of the conclusion of the arguments is likely to 
seem far more plausible than some of the arguments' premises. Further, 
although Leibniz could have appealed to the principle that "every truth 
has an explanation" to support premises (2) and (3) in (L *), and premise 
(2) in (L **), we would not want to make such an appeal, for this principle 
of sufficient reason - as Leibniz conceived of it, anyway - has the unfor-
tunate consequence that everything that happens, happens necessarily.9 
Further still, two sorts of choices made by human beings seem to pro-
vide counterexamples to the premise that choice implies moral prefer-
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ence. In the first place, human beings appear to make incontinent choic-
es. Leibniz denied that anyone could act incontinently. Though con-
sciousness of our own weak wills leads us to reject Leibniz's general 
claim here, we certainly acknowledge that God is not weak-willed. 
Whether the point is argued with reference to God's goodness, or 
power, or knowledge, incontinence seems incompatible with divinity. 
So the general premise that choice implies moral preference can simply 
be reformulated to circumvent the first counterexample. But there is a 
second, more damaging counterexample: human beings often appear to 
make choices among alternatives equally attractive. Leibniz denied that 
such choices are made; he held that there are "minute perceptions" of 
which we're not fully cognizant that always determine our selections. 
But empirical evidence supporting his judgment is lacking. (Perhaps a 
Leibnizian would suggest that even if humans can make choices among 
equally attractive alternatives, God can't do so. But an argument would 
be needed to support the suggestion and it's not evident how the argu-
ment would go.) Finally, it might be objected that premise (2) of (L **) 
wrongly assumes that moral goodness is not the only kind of goodness. 
Leibniz clearly thinks that all choices are ultimately moral choices,l° but 
the position needs a defense. 
It seems at the very least problematical, then, to accept Leibniz's con-
tention that the coherence of the concept of the best possible world can 
be seen to follow on an argument that our world is the best." 
We want to offer a variation of Leibniz's basic argument - a variation 
of (L) - which does not assume the coherence of the concept "best possi-
ble world." Our argument is a variation in a rather loose sense: it does 
not yield the conclusion that God must create the best possible world, but 
it does yield the conclusion that God must create. This variation is consis-
tent both with the hypothesis that there is an infinite series of increasingly 
better possible worlds, and with the hypothesis that there are infinitely 
many worlds in the set of best possible worlds. 
Our argument requires constructing two sets of possible worlds 
(where a "possible world" is a "total possible state of affairs," and, 
hence, one of the possible worlds is the state of affairs that consists of 
God's existence alone, without any creation). The first set of possible 
worlds we'll define - call it W - includes (a) the possible state of 
affairs (or possible world) consisting of God's existence alone, without 
any created or actualized material or immaterial world, and (b) the pos-
sible worlds consisting of God's existence plus the existence of a created 
or actualized world that is not good. W has within it, we presume, infi-
nitely many possible total states of affairs. The second set of possible 
worlds - call it W* - also includes infinitely many possible total states 
of affairs: those consisting of God's existence plus the existence of an 
actualized material or immaterial world that is good. 
(5) 1. There is at least one world in W*. 
2. If there is at least one world in the set of possible worlds 
W*, then God must create a material world (must actualize 
one of the possible worlds in W*) [because) 
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a. Some possible worlds in W* are better than all possi-
ble worlds in W. 
b. Where there are possible worlds of type x that are 
better than possible worlds of type y, God's act of 
creating a type-x world is better than his act of creat-
ing a type-y world. 
c. If one action is better than another, then God cannot 
choose the less perfect action over the more perfect 
action.12 
So, 3. God must create a world in W*. 
Assuming (as we are) that God exists, the existence of the actual 
world strongly suggests that premise (1) is true. 
What of premise (2)? If it is true, then the traditional position con-
cerning God's absolute freedom in creation is false. We consider here 
several ways of arguing against the second premise, one of which we 
will endorse. 
Perhaps the standard Thomistic line of attack against premise (2) 
involves refutation of (2-a). It is often said that one can't add to the infi-
nite, and since God is infinite there is no greater value in a W* world 
than in the state of affairs that consists of God alone. But as Aquinas 
noted, one can make additions to the infinite if one goes into a different 
order of infinity.13 
Moreover, this "standard" Thomistic approach - which may not 
have been Aquinas's approach - makes the divine creative action out to 
be nugatory, and we don't think that it is nugatory. It is not a main pur-
pose of ours to offer a full-fledged defense of premise (2-a). We think 
the conclusion of (5) is false, and our main concern will be to attack a 
later premise of argument (5). However, we do want to indicate how a 
case for (2-a) might be built, because we think that in fact this premise 
can be defended. And if it can be, that means our attack on a later 
premise of (5) will have added significance for the defender of the tradi-
tional position that God does not create necessarily. 
A complete defense of (2-a) requires an account of grading worlds.14 
The intriguing and multi-faceted question of how (or even whether) 
worlds can be graded in goodness received Aquinas's careful attention 
and has of late interested diverse commentators on Aquinas.ls Among 
the issues the question raises are these: What is a world? Are there dif-
ferent kinds of worlds? Is the criterion of goodness for a thing deter-
mined by its kind's function? Does the world have a function? Can 
states of affairs within the world be graded in goodness? How do assess-
ments of the goodness of parts of the world contribute to our assessment 
of the whole? If some thing x is a good x, is it necessary that x be a good 
for some conscious being? Might some possible worlds be incommensu-
rable in value? 
But it is not necessary to settle all of these matters before beginning to 
construct a defense of (2-a).16 A defense of (2-a) will emphasize the fact 
that the premise does not claim that all possible worlds are commensu-
rable in value, or that there are ordinal rankings of possible worlds. It 
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suffices that at least one possible world in W* is better than the worlds in 
W. Knowledge that being has value in and of itself may be knowledge 
enough to support (2-a). Knowledge that a particular possible world in 
W* is good for some of the individuals it contains together with the 
belief that the possible world is not necessarily bad for any of the indi-
viduals it contains may be enough to support (2-a), even if we do not 
know exactly how goods for individuals contribute to goods for worlds 
(presumably, great goods for many individuals will not detract from the 
overall value of a world, at least not enough to make the value the world 
adds to God's existence a negative value). 
In sum, the intuition we have - an intuition many will share - that 
premise (2-a) is correct may well admit of rigorous support. 
What of premise (2b)?'7 If one were to argue against it one presum-
ably would target its counterpart, which avoids talk of types of worlds: 
Where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's 
act of creating x will be better than his act of creating y. 
It might be said (against the counterpart claim) that one can't consider 
actions abstractly, that any judgment about an action is a judgment 
about the action in certain circumstances: studying mathematics, for 
instance, is the right thing to do now, in these circumstances. But we do 
speak as though some actions are better than others, abstractly: doing 
high-level math is better than doing low-level math, abstractly consid-
ered, though one may have obligations to children or students that make 
it better in a particular circumstance to do the less exalted work. If x is 
better than y, abstractly, than creating x is better than creating y, 
abstractly. And then if nothing stands in the way in the circumstances, 
it's preferable actually to create X. 18 
It might also be suggested that the counterpart claim is false because 
though objects of acts always contribute to the goodness of acts, differ-
ences in the goodness of objects don't always or necessarily affect the 
goodness of the associated acts. It has been suggested to US '9 that: 
II[Plerhaps having an object of goodness 1-4 gives an act 2 
'object goodness points,' having an object of goodness 5-8 gives 
an act 4 'object goodness points,' and the differences between 1 
and 4 and between 5 and 8 are not relevant to act goodness. Is it 
really better to create a beach with a million grains of sand than 
to create a beach with 999,999? Why? More seriously, perhaps 
creating a universe with some rational agents is better than cre-
ating a universe with none, but the number of rational agents 
isn't really relevant." 
But if one weakens in this way the connection between the goodness of 
the object and the goodness of the act, it is not clear why we should say 
that there is any connection at all. Further, the particular cases men-
tioned present some perplexities. Given the homogeneous set-up (virtu-
ally identical grains of sand, e.g.), it's very strange that there would be 
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thresholds (between 4 and 5, for instance) where for no discernible rea-
son it becomes valuable to add a grain of sand. If adding a grain of sand 
changed the order of the whole, it would make more sense to speak of an 
increase in value - but the role order plays in judging the value of a cre-
ative act has dropped out in the example given. So maybe it's not better 
to create a beach with a million grains of sand than a beach with 999,999 
(or a world with a million rational persons instead of 999,999). In fact, 
it's not clear that the bigger beach is abstractly speaking better than the 
smaller one anyway - it may not be if, for instance, we must always ask 
"better for whom?" when we claim x is better than y. 
Or, it might be suggested that Robert Adams has provided counterex-
amples to what we've called "the counterpart claim" (the claim that 
where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's act of cre-
ating x will be better than his act of creating y). Richard Swinburne, for 
instance, writes: "Anyway, even if there could be a best of all possible 
worlds, it seems highly dubious to suppose that God is under any moral 
obligation to create such a world. This has been well argued in an 
important article by Robert Merrihew Adams .... "21 We think, however, 
and will argue briefly here, that Adams has not provided counterexam-
ples to the counterpart claim. 
If God is obliged to create the best possible world, Adams holds,2' it is 
because by not doing so either he wrongs someone, or he is less kind 
than he should be, or he manifests a defect in character (such as envv). 
But, Adams says, God doesn't wrong anyone or fail to act kindly 
towards anyone if he creates a world less good than the best possible 
world. And he doesn't manifest a defect in character, because he instead 
exhibits a virtue: God exhibits the virtue of grace in choosing "to create 
and love less excellent creatures than He could have chosen." He could 
have made a better world had he chosen to create better creatures, 
Adams says, but it is not wrong to create beings less excellent than oth-
ers one could have created, and in choosing this world, with us in it, 
God acts graciously. Adams says that two sorts of cases show it's not 
wrong or even less than ideal to create beings less excellent than other 
beings one could have created: cases in which human beings who are 
breeding animals breed less than the best - goldfish, for instance, rather 
than golden retrievers; and cases in which humans choose to have nor-
mal children rather than super-children they could conceive through 
taking a certain drug. 
We agree with Adams that it is not wrong or less than ideal for 
human beings to breed goldfish instead of golden retrievers, and that it 
is not wrong or less than ideal for human beings to refrain from taking a 
drug that would produce super-children. In considering Adams's exam-
ples, however, one needs to ask: why aren't these things wrong? One 
needs to ask this question because one needs to know whether the rea-
sons that apply in the case of human beings also apply in the divine 
case. We suggest here that they do not. 
In the case where one imagines someone choosing to breed goldfish, 
one presumably imagines the work as part of an overall life rich in vari-
ous ways, where the breeding project may be connected to other impor-
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tant projects; for instance, conducting scientific research, or supporting a 
family in one's own particular circumstances, that is, with the talents and 
resources one has. But now imagine the project of breeding new strains 
of weeds, not because one's interested in agriculture or in improving the 
world's food supply, not because one has the research interests of the 
botanist, but simply as a way of taking up time. Imagine the project not 
of breeding new strains of weeds, but simply of growing weeds, grow-
ing, or bringing into existence, as many weeds as is possible. Is this an 
admirable project? What about counting the weeds or the blades of grass 
in your front yard?" The fact is that some projects are better than others. 
And it seems plausible that some creative projects are better than others, 
abstractly speaking. 
Why isn't it wrong for prospective parents to refuse a drug that will 
produce super-children? Adams doesn't say. It would be reasonable to 
think that because taking the drug involves using unnatural measures to 
achieve one's purposes, one needn't - or shouldn't - take the drug. 
And perhaps the purposes are relevant, too: if the aim is to produce 
super-human, non-human beings, then the aim is off-limits. But God is 
not constrained by what is "natural" in the same way that human beings 
are; it is difficult to see what baseline could be used in making judg-
ments about what's natural for God. 
So the interesting examples Adams develops do not suggest that (S) is 
vulnerable to attack at (2-b). 
Are there other ways to argue for the counterpart claim (the claim 
that where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's act of 
creating x will be better than his act of creating y)? Arguments to sup-
port the counterpart claim might be found in Aquinas's texts. His gen-
eral theory of norms for actions measures acts by their objects and ends. 
It would seem that God's actions would be measurable in the same way. 
Furthermore, in discussing the incarnation Aquinas indicates that it may 
be more fitting for God to do one thing rather than another; and one 
might argue that a thing can't be more fitting unless it's better. On the 
other hand, Aquinas sometimes writes as if the general norms are not 
applicable in any straightforward way in God's case. 
However this is to be worked out within the context of Aquinas's 
thought, the least that can be said is that it's not easy to see how it's sup-
posed to turn out that one of God's actions isn't better than another 
given that the states of affairs they produce differ in value. 
The problem with (2), we suggest, is not with (2b), but with (2c), that 
is, with the claim that if one action is better than another, then God can-
not choose the less perfect action over the more perfect action. Suppose 
there is no best possible world. Then God must choose a state of affairs 
less good than another he could have chosen, whatever he does (this is 
assuming that creating nothing is choosing a state of affairs). But if one 
accepts this, why would one stipulate that the action he chooses to per-
form must be better than one of the (good) choices he could have made, 
which consists of not creating any material world? It seems completely 
arbitrary to require that God create a material world, to hold that God's 
creation is necessary, but to allow that he might create less than the best 
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possible world, that he might perform some creative act less good than 
another he was capable of performing. (In Section II of this paper we 
consider whether appeal to a "diffusiveness of goodness" principle 
might provide a non-arbitrary ground for the requirement that God 
must create, though he may create a world less good than another he 
might have created. We argue that such an appeal does not provide a 
non-arbitrary ground for the requirement.) 
Recognizing this problem with (2c) allows us to formulate another 
objection to (L), and also to Leibniz's arguments (L *) and (L **) purport-
ing to establish that our world is the best possible world. Furthermore, 
it allows us to respond to the following Leibnizian argument: 
(L ***) 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
So, 5. 
God chose to create this world. 
God can't choose a less perfect action over a more perfect 
action. 
So when God created the world, there was no action open 
to him better than the action of creating this world. 
Where possible world x is better than possible world y, God's 
act of creating x will be better than his act of creating y. 
There is no possible world God could have created better 
than this world. 
Given the fact that the conclusion of (L ***) is so unpalatable (no more 
palatable than the claim that our world is the best possible world), it is 
useful to have a rejoinder to (L ***). But (L ***) is not susceptible to the 
criticisms we earlier raised against (L *) and (L **). 
We can, however, reject (L ***) as well as (L), (L *), and (L **) by reject-
ing premise (2c), the premise that "God can't choose a less perfect action 
over a more perfect action." As we've just noted, this contention can be 
true only under the arbitrary stipulation that some good choices open to 
God aren't good enough for him to adopt, while other good choices are 
good enough to adopt, even though there would be better choices. 
Neither (L) nor (5), then, compels us to overturn the traditional posi-
tion that God's creation is absolutely free. 24 
Our reasoning here suggests that if there were a best possible world, 
then God would have to create it; or if there were a set of best possible 
worlc ... .;, ~od would have to pick one from the set. As theists, we infer 
there is no best possible world, and no set of best possible worlds. Perhaps 
for any world one picks, there is a better. But there are alternative posi-
tions, and given our citation (in footnote 11) of Leibniz's attack on the 
notion of an infinite series of increasingly better worlds, the alternatives 
are important to notice. If (some) possible worlds are incommensurable in 
value, or if possible worlds cannot be graded at all, we also have reason 
for thinking that God need not create the best possible world. 
Philip Quinn has recently presented a Leibnizian argument suggesting 
that God must create the best possible world. We close Section I of this 
paper with an evaluation of his argument. The argument has a problem, 
we suggest, similar to the problem we identified in argument (5). 
Quinn's argument is offered as a response to the case Robert Adams 
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has made for the claim that God needn't create the best possible world, 
even assuming there is such a thing. (We discussed Adams's case above 
as we considered how premise (2b) of argument S might be attacked.) 
Quinn's response to Adams's line of reasoning considers the defensibility 
of several variations on the Leibnizian dictum that God must create the 
best possible world. The variation Quinn endorses is:25 
"If an omnipotent and superlatively good moral agent were to 
actualize a possible world, he would actualize some actualizable 
world of unsurpassable moral goodness." 
This conditional is supported, Quinn says, by the following principle, 
which we call "Q":2b 
(Q) "Necessarily, for all w, w', and x, if w is an actualizable 
world and w' is an actualizable world and w is a morally 
better world than w', then if x is an omnipotent moral agent 
and x actualizes w', then x is such that there is some possi-
ble world in which there is a y such that y is a better moral 
agent in that world than he is in w'." 
What are we to make of Quinn's argument, and in particular of the 
crucial premise (Q)? In the first place, we note that Quinn offers virtual-
ly no defense of (Q). He has two things to say on its behalf. One is that 
it seems to him that (Q) "expresses a fairly obvious truth."?7 It does not 
seem obvious to us. Quinn also notes that (Q) does not fall prey to cer-
tain of Adams's counterexamples to the principle that "it is wrong to 
bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could 
have brought into existence."2H But assuming this is true, it does not con-
stitute an argument for (Q). 
Why does Quinn think (Q) expresses a fairly obvious truth? How 
might one argue in favor of (Q)? (Q) appears to us to rest on an assump-
tion we have criticized, the assumption that if one action is better than 
another, then God, a perfectly good moral agent, cannot choose the less 
perfect action over the more perfect action. (This assumption is premise 
(2-c) in argument S above.) At least, Quinn's principle could be support-
ed by an appeal to the assumption. Quinn does not explicitly appeal to 
this assumption or to any other ground for his principle. We think that 
some ground for the principle needs to be found if the principle is to be 
supported, but since our aim is not to support the principle, we do not 
explore this issue in detail. The fact that (Q) may rest on the question-
able assumption is perhaps obscured in Quinn's discussion by his claim 
that if an agent does not do the best he can, morally speaking, then it is 
possible that there is another agent morally better than the first agent. 
But this claim is true only if a perfectly good moral agent cannot choose 
the less perfect action over the more perfect action. And that is to say, 
this claim is false. 
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(II) 
We now turn to a second set of arguments against the traditional posi-
tion that God's creation is absolutely free. These arguments rely on the 
Platonic or Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive. 
We speak in the plural here of "arguments," but we do not lay each one 
out. That's because the multiplicity of the arguments is a consequence of 
the multiplicity of interpretations of the diffusiveness principle. We will 
set out some of these multiple interpretations; with them in hand the 
anti-traditionalist may construct his arguments. 
(DP) Goodness is necessarily diffusive of itself. 
Such is one standard formulation of the diffusiveness principle. What 
does the principle mean? 
Plato's role in establishing the principle has been seminal, so we 
might begin by asking what help he can give us in interpreting it. The 
early pages of the Timaclls provide frequently cited and influentiaF9 sup-
port for the diffusiveness principle. Plato's cosmogony presents two 
reasons for thinking that the divine craftsman must create the best possi-
ble world. One reason is that a failure to do so would exhibit the vice of 
jealousy; a second reason is that a good craftsman always makes any 
work as good as it can be. Perhaps the reason a craftsman always pro-
duces the best work possible is that a failure to do so reflects envy; or 
perhaps the two reasons are independent. At any rate, the argument 
that a craftsman must create the best work possible suggests the follow-
ing principle that might be used to argue that God must create the best 
possible world: If, when one creates an x, one ought to create a good x, 
then one ought, prima facie, to make that x as good as it can be. This 
principle, however, doesn't seem to be a specification of the diffusive-
ness principle. In fact, it seems more to resemble some of the principles 
we worked with in section (1). 
The Timaeus is not the only work of Plato's that contributed to the for-
mation of the diffusiveness principle. The metaphor of light Plato used 
repeatedly and to powerful effect in describing the Form of the Good 
played a role in making the diffusiveness principle attractive, for 
instance, and certainly influenced Plotinus's view of the inevitability of 
creation. But it's unlikely reflecting on this metaphor of light is the 
quickest route to interpreting (DP). One of the many problems we'd 
encounter in our reflections is the fact that (DP) must be interpreted as 
applying to moral agents if the principle is to ground an argument that 
God must create. 
The short answer to the question, "how much help can Plato give us 
in interpreting the diffusiveness principle?" is: for our purposes, not 
much. Should we, then, turn to Plotinus or Pseudo-Dionysius? Should 
we look at Aquinas? 
The diffusiveness principle is what we might call a "deep maxim." 
Philosophical principles or maxims may sometimes have the form of 
"deep maxims" or "deep sayings": these are philosophical maxims that 
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are not precisely expressed, but which concern deep matters. For 
instance, "meaning is use" and "truth is correspondence to reality" are 
deep maxims (compare them with Quine's more sharply formulated 
point: "to be is to be the value of a bound variable"). Meditation on deep 
maxims yields further results. Thus Tarski, meditating on Aristotle (who 
doesn't exactly use the language of "correspondence," but something like 
it), offers a refinement of Aristotle. Or, consider the deep maxim "do not 
do evil in order that good may come." In some sense this principle seems 
right. But a wide range of questions must be answered before an inter-
pretation is specified; philosophical work must be done. 
What we need to do to understand whether (DP) mandates God's cre-
ation is specify precisely its various possible interpretations. What we will 
try to do with the diffusiveness principle is in a way what Aquinas did in 
discussing the principles his predecessors used. Perhaps the point is worth 
emphasizing here, because one of the problems some critics have had with 
Aquinas's interpretation of the diffusiveness principle is that Aquinas inter-
prets it in a way that seems to be at variance with his predecessors.3u We 
don't deny that Aquinas may well take principles in a way at variance with 
his predecessors, but we think one reason he does is that there are problems 
with the predecessors' interpretations. Aquinas often takes maxims, some-
times maxims so obscure that they verge on the mystical, and works with 
them to draw out their most defensible senses. For instance, he considers 
the scriptural claim that the name of God is "I am"; though the exact mean-
ing of this saying is nearly impenetrable, Aquinas articulates an under-
standing of the claim that gives the lofty, literary expression philosophical 
sense. He is committed to preserving the truth of "goodness is diffusive of 
itself" without preserving past interpretations. 
So let us likewise try mapping out interpretations of (DP) without becom-
ing mired in historical exegesis. There are many dimensions of variability 
we can build into our interpretations - among the questions that arise are: 
Does the being (we assume there is a being, an agent) diffuse its very own 
goodness? Does it create? Does it merely endow with goodness? Is the 
being merely disposed to endow? Does the being create/ endow /have a dis-
position to endow all? Does the being create/ endow /have a disposition to 
endow goodness in a maximal degree? Does the being exercise final rather 
than efficient causality in diffusing goodness? 
We offer a beginning sketch of some possible interpretations of (DP). All 
of the interpretations we've included here construe the diffusiveness princi-
ple as requiring efficient causation, because if one is going to try to pull a 
mandate for creation out of the principle, it seems the principle must be 
taken as referring to efficient causation. 
(DPl) Necessarily, a being is good if and only if it brings it about that 
[every possible thing exists and shares its very goodnessl or 
[something exists and shares its very goodnessl or 
[whatever already exists shares its very goodnessl. 
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(DP2) Necessarily, a being is good iff for any x, if it's possible for x 
to exist, then the being brings it about that x exists and has 
[to a maximal degree a similar property of goodness] or 
[to some degree a similar property of goodnessl. 
(DP3) Necessarily, a being is good iff it brings it about that whatev-
er already exists shares its very goodness. 
(DP4) Necessarily, a being is good iff for any x that already exists, 
the being brings it about that 
[x maximally imitates it] or 
[x imitates it to some degreel. 
(DPS) Necessarily, a being is good iff it is possible for that being to 
bring it about that 
[every possible thing exists] or [some thing exists] 
and is endowed with [a maximal degree of] or [some] type-
wise goodness, 
or 
[all] or [some] already-existing entities distinct from itself 
are endowed with [a maximal degree of] or [some] type-wise 
goodness. 
(DP6) Necessarily, a thing is good iff it is disposed to bring it about that 
[everything] or [something] have a property similar to its own 
goodness. 
First, a general comment about these interpretations. As we have 
spelled the interpretations out, they have within them divergent paths 
- bracketed options offer sub-choices. And there are additional paths 
we haven't indicated among the bracketed options. For instance, some-
one opting for the first clause under (DPl) would have to give some 
coherent account of what "every possible thing" means. Are we talking 
here about the largest compossible set of existents? What sorts of enti-
ties count as "things"? Only objects of creation that are in some sense 
immediate (in God's case, perhaps, possible worlds that can be "actual-
ized")? Are possible natural kinds the relevant sorts of "things" - are 
they among the relevant sorts of things? What about poems? What 
about individual members of natural kinds, or individual poems? 
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Similar questions can be raised about the other interpretations of (DPl). 
Since we are not defending a particular interpretation of (DP), we are 
not especially concerned with tracing out all the possible interpretive 
paths. The variants we have identified will be sufficient to suggest that 
it would be hard to find a plausible interpretation that yields the man-
date to create, and that one who holds that Dionysian considerations do 
require God to create is obligated to produce an argument based on a 
specific interpretation of the Dionysian principle. 
Let's consider the plausibility of the various specifications. 
(DP1) When a river overflows its banks it diffuses its verv water over 
wider ground. But at least outside the trinity, things don't lite~ally come to 
share God's goodness, any more than they share his being. Rather, an enti-
ty comes to share properties which are similar to, causally linked with, 
God's properties. So (DPl) is not acceptable. This point may seem trivial, 
but we make it because Norman Kretzmann, whose work we will soon dis-
cuss, maintains that one shouldn't read the diffusiveness principle as con-
cerned with final causality since under such a reading goodness is not really 
communicated. We think any sensible interpretation of the principle will be 
one in which goodness is not "really" communicated in the strong sense in 
which river water is "communicated" to the banks. Perhaps there is some-
thing weaker than this that could reasonably be called "real communica-
tion" that is involved in efficient but not final causality - but we think the 
burden of specifying such an interpretation falls on the person who endors-
es the interpretation. 
Another problem with (DPl) is that it seemingly allows nothing but 
God to be good. The same problem affects most - probably all - of the 
other interpretations of (DP) we've offered. For our present purposes it 
can be solved simply by revising the principles so that they state necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an agent being perfectly or unsurpassedly or 
maximally good. Though this would solve the problem for our present 
purposes, it would also strip the diffusiveness principle of its broad scope, 
and that might in other contexts be problematical. Perhaps one could say 
that a DP-type principle holds for a perfectly good being as a consequence 
of a more general diffusiveness principle that governs the goodness of all 
moral agents. There of course would be lots of work involved in specify-
ing and defending this more general diffusiveness principle. 
(DP2) If we go with the first bracketed clause under (DP2), we get the 
objectionable consequence that there is a best possible world. If we go 
with the second clause, we've made the completely arbitrary (and hence 
objectionable) stipulation that God must create every possible thing, but 
needn't endow each thing with the greatest possible quantity of good-
ness. If he needn't endow with the greatest possible goodness, why 
can't he be satisfied with the good state of affairs which consists only of 
his own existence? 
(DP3 - DP6) These interpretations of the diffusiveness principle don't 
entail that a creation is necessary. 
We have so far discussed no plausible interpretation of (DP) that man-
dates creation. 
Now our list of possible interpretations of (DP) involving efficient 
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causality certainly omits some readings, but if one of the omitted possi-
ble readings is deemed important, the interpretation must be specified 
and the importance argued. The burden of proof here is surely on the 
one who claims that (OP) entails the necessity of creation. 
Kretzmann is among those who have claimed that (OP) requires God 
to create. Although Kretzmann does not undertake the project of explic-
itly defending or even specifying any particular interpretation of the dif-
fusiveness principle, he does give an account of creation which, if plausi-
ble, would help specify an interpretation of (OP). Furthermore, his 
account, if plausible, might be of special interest to those attracted to 
theism who think our world is not the best possible world, since 
Kretzmann thinks one can block the move from "God must create" to 
"God must create the best possible world./I So we will spend some time 
here examining Kretzmann's understanding of creation. 
Kretzmann does not explicitly list or identify the key theses or 
assumptions of his account. We identify the following suppositions as 
important elements in the account: 31 
(K) 0) God must diffuse his goodness by freely creating a world 
that represents him maximally but not excrescently. 
(2) There is an upper limit to what creaturely minds can appreciate. 
(3) Our world is not the best possible world. 
Some of the terminology in the first supposition requires explanation. 
Kretzmann says that if our world represents God maximally, then "the actu-
al world considered as a representation of God is as good as possible in the 
sense that any world better than this one in terms of improved precision of 
representation would be no better at all in its capacity to represent God to 
any possible created percipient./l32 Kretzmann does not use the phrase 
"excrescent creation"; we introduce it as shorthand for the idea that the 
world contains a greater degree of representation than it's possible for any 
creature to understand. 
We want to suggest that the first and second of these suppositions are 
doubtful in their own right, and that further, when the third is added an 
inconsistent set may be generated. 
Though (1) points towards a specification of the diffusiveness princi-
ple, the specification is implausible. It tells us that since the rationality 
of God's choice is pegged to the world's representative features, God has 
no reason for including any unappreciated features in the world.33 A 
tree that falls in the forest makes no sound unless there's someone 
around to hear it; indeed; there are no trees in the forest unless the forest 
is explored - maybe constantly. Our views of the world are views of a 
big Hollywood set, appearances without substance. 
A person defending the first supposition in (K) might say that this notion 
that the universe is hollow, is a facade, assumes that the trees in the forest 
play no causal role in the universe. But this would be a weak defense, for 
surely God can do as he likes without secondary causes. Or, a defender 
might say that if God were to make a hollow universe then God would be a 
deceiver. But where's the deceit? We can deduce that the world is a shell of 
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accidents, given Kretzmann's account of creation. 
The first supposition in (K) seems implausible for a second reason: it 
appears to stipulate arbitrarily that, given a choice between a world with 
one maximally appreciative creaturely intelligence plus a handful of far 
less appreciative creatures, and a world with vast multitudes of almost-
maximally appreciative creaturely intelligences, God must pick the first 
world. (This requirement holds given Kretzmann's understanding of 
"maximal representation"; as we indicated above, Kretzmann takes a 
world to represent God maximally only if there is no world that better 
represents God to any possible created percipient.) 
There's a third reason supposition (1) is implausible. If possible world 
alpha represents God's goodness as well as and no better than beta, then, 
assuming the conditions in (1) are met by both alpha and beta, God may 
choose between them. Indeed, God must have an option of this sort if his 
selection is free, Kretzmann says. But that means that either the selection of 
alpha over beta serves no purpose of God's, or it serves a purpose uncon-
nected to the diffusion of goodness. If picking alpha over beta serves no pur-
pose of God's, but God simply prefers alpha, then why can't God pick one of 
the worlds that contains an excrescence of goodness simply because he 
prefers it? If choosing alpha over beta serves a purpose unconnected to the 
diffusion of goodness, why can't God use considerations other than those 
involving the diffusion of goodness in choosing which world to create?" 
Consider the second presupposition in (K): "There is an upper limit 
to what creaturely minds can appreciate." This too seems doubtful. It 
may be that what we can learn from direct encounter with the world is 
limited. But why couldn't we appreciate the same kind of thing over 
and over, for instance through endless exploration of the stars? There is 
a kind of infinitude intrinsic to the human mind: there is nothing about 
which we can't understand something. Even truths we are incapable of 
discovering through empirical investigation or reason may partially be 
grasped or appreciated by the human mind - God could, if he liked, 
whisper to us various secrets about the trinity, for instance. And he 
could inform us that certain things exist which we can't directly appreci-
ate. In these cases it would seem that there is not the sort of upper limit 
Kretzmann imagines. There is not a limit such that we can't imagine a 
better world whose increased value we could appreciate in some way. 
Furthermore, (2) is ambiguous, and on all of the possible readings that 
suggest themselves it is problematical. Call the upper limit mentioned in (2) 
UL. On one reading - call it (a) - UL is the lowest limit none of the crea-
tures can attain. On another reading, (b), UL is such that some creatures can 
attain it, though no creature can go beyond it. Assume (a) is the correct 
understanding of (2). Then our world represents God's goodness excres-
cently, because no creature can appreciate it. But this is inconsistent with 
(1). And if our world does represent God's goodness excrescently, why 
couldn't he have created some other world with an even greater excres-
cence of goodness? Assume (b) is the correct reading. It then follows that 
God actually has created the highest form of creaturely intelligence and 
placed it in an unimprovable position to know or appreciate the world. 
This is highly implausible. In fact, it follows that, contrary to (3), God has 
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indeed created the best possible world. For how could there be a better 
world? If there were a better world, it seems either it would have to be bet-
ter for someone, or better simpliciter. But who could it be better for? Not 
God, and not the creatures that can't appreciate it. And if it is claimed to be 
better simpliciter, then in the first place one needs to give an account of what 
the claim means (how can something be "better," but not "better for some-
thing or someone"?). And in the second place, one needs to explain why 
God couldn't say: I choose to create this world over that world because sim-
pliciter, this world is better. 
One might think that some modifications in Kretzmann's account of 
creation would substantially strengthen it. There are two modifications 
which, we think, might seem attractive. The first involves saying that it 
is possible for God to create excrescently, so long as such a creation is 
necessary to obtain the best possible representation of God to creaturely 
intelligences. The second, more radical modification involves claiming 
that there's no reason to stipulate that it's necessary that God does not 
create excrescently, but only to stipulate that it's not necessary that God 
create excrescently. 
But neither of these modifications would save Kretzmann's account, 
for there is yet a further ambiguity involved in specifying UL. We sug-
gested above that there are two readings of UL, which we labeled (a) 
and (b). The modifications in (K) we've just offered would remove the 
problems we identified as attached to reading (a). But now consider a 
further interpretive question, which can be raised under both (a) and (b). 
Must God create the best possible world that we can fully understand as 
a manifestation of God's goodness? If so, then it looks like he can't cre-
ate any world, because since we can't completely understand God's 
goodness, it would seem we couldn't fully understand any world as a 
manifestation of his goodness. Is it instead the case, then, that God must 
create the best possible world that can be appreciated in some degree? If 
so, then God can make the best possible world, and simply inform us of 
the fact that he has done so. Our intellects have a universality that 
would make it possible to appreciate such a fact. But (3) tells us our 
world is not the best possible. So once again, we find an inconsistency 
in the set of propositions in (K).3' 
We conclude from all this that Kretzmann's account of creation is unper-
suasive and that it cannot readily be modified to withstand objections. 
Kretzmann's attempt to block the move from "God must create" to "God 
must create the best possible world" fails; and his account does not point 
towards a plausible specification of (DP). 
It might be suggested that even though we haven't found a defensible 
interpretation of (DP) that mandates creation, there is good reason to try 
to formulate such an interpretation, since many people have an intuitive 
sense that goodness has to be shared, that generosity must be a compo-
nent of perfect goodness. Kretzmann has, in fact, suggested that we 
have this intuitive sense; he thinks the Dionysian principle "expresses an 
important truth about goodness."36 
We want to close with a few remarks on the intuition that goodness 
has to be shared. 
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Traditional theism has certainly acknowledged that goodness has to 
be shared. God's goodness is shared among the three persons of the trin-
ity, it has been maintained. But Kretzmann thinks this sharing doesn't go 
far enough. Why not? For one thing, he says, self-diffusiveness must be 
a property of the triune God, and not just of each of the three persons, 
and "the essential self-diffusiveness of goodness as an aspect of the 
essence of the triune God" calls for "extrinsic, volitional diffusion, or cre-
ation."3? Granted that the triune God is good, we don't think enough is 
understood about the trinity to say that the triune God can't diffuse his 
very own goodness through the love exchanged by the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. 
Kretzmann also says we have an intuitive understanding of what it 
means to say "God is love" which requires that God create a material 
world. Kretzmann criticizes Peter Geach's defense of the claim that 
"God is love because, and only because, the Three Persons eternally love 
each other"38 by claiming that "Geach transforms 'God is love,' the tran-
scendent comfort of Christians for 2,000 years, into a Dear-John letter 
from the triune God to everyone of those unsuspecting loving crea-
tures."39 Now when we say "God is love" we may very well have in 
mind his love for us; God did, after all, create a material world, we are in 
the world, and Love has entered the world. But this doesn't mean that 
God would not be love if God had not created. From eternity and for 
eternity, God is love. And the fact that God would still be love even if 
he had not created does not mean that he does not love us (presumably, 
Kretzmann is suggesting that given Geach's understanding of love, God 
doesn't love us - a Dear-John letter Ineans the sender doesn't love the 
recipient). 
If Geach's statement that "God is love because, and only because, the 
Three Persons eternally love each other" is taken to mean that God 
would be love even if he created things and didn't love them, then the 
statement is false, we think. But we see no reason to think Geach would 
recommend such an interpretation. Rather, we think Geach is saying 
that God is love; he creates things and loves them, but it is not in virtue 
of this that he is love. 
The traditional theistic view that the persons of the trinity exchange 
love, that they share goodness and exhibit generosity is, we believe, cor-
rect. Our intuitive sense that goodness involves sharing requires no 
more than this. And, as we have said, we think that one who claims that 
a diffusiveness principle (or an intuition about sharing) entails the 
necessity of creation should specify a plausible interpretation of the 
principle and show that the interpretation has the entailment. 
In sum, we are aware of no plausible interpretation of the diffusive-
ness principle requiring God to create, and see no good reason for think-
ing one can be constructed. The Dionysian arguments that God must 
create are no more successful than the Leibnizian arguments. 
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